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Executive Summary
Since their inception in 1991, charter schools have become a widely-adopted school
choice policy intended to increase educational outcomes through competition and innovation.
The details of how states structure their charter school laws are diverse across states, which
raises the question of whether certain law parameters are better than others at attracting and
maintaining high-quality charter schools.
Charter schools are designed around the basis of market accountability; they must attract
students in order to remain in operation. The threat of closure is an incentive built into the charter
model that is intended to increase school performance. For this reason, I define charter school
success across states in terms of charter school closures, with the understanding that the closure
rate should not be zero (indicating a lack of enforcement) but it should also not be too high
(indicating poor authorizing practices).
Charter school advocates have strong beliefs about which law parameters are most
conducive to the health of a state’s charter environment. I chose two law components that are
recommended by two prominent advocacy groups and examined their effect on state charter
school closures. Contrary to the claims of the interest groups, I did not find that these parameters
impacted charter school closings.
Through a series of case studies, I further examined the advocacy groups’ policy
preferences by comparing their state charter school law ranking systems. The findings of this
project demonstrate that state policymakers are being pulled in different directions over policies
that may actually have no real impact on charter school outcomes.
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Introduction
In 2017, Kentucky became the forty-fourth state to pass legislation authorizing the
creation of charter schools. Charter schools are publicly funded schools that are operated by nongovernmental entities. The US Department of Education’s National Charter School Resource
Center defines these schools as “public schools operating under a ‘charter,’ essentially a contract
entered into between the school and its authorizing agency.” Each school’s contract establishes
the conditions and timeframe of their funding from the state and frees them from many of the
regulations that govern traditional public schools. Unlike traditional public schools (TPS),
charter schools do not have designated geographic area from which their student population is
mandated. Instead, charter school students and their families must actively choose for the student
to attend the school.
Minnesota was the first state to adopt a charter school law in 1991, and since then states
have varied greatly in their law design (National Conference of State Legislators 2012). Some of
the law parameters include the amount of freedom given to charter schools, the funding
structures, limits on numbers or types of allowed charters, and the process by which charter
schools are opened and monitored. Charter schools are a widely adopted policy option intended
to expand the education marketplace by increasing innovation and competition, thus helping
families to better match with their educational preferences. Because there is diversity among the
details of charter school laws across states, it is important to evaluate how various law
components impact each state’s ability to achieve that policy goal. My research question is as
follows: What is the relationship, if any, between a state’s charter school law and its charter
school closures?
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The statewide charter closure rate is a good indicator of the success of charter schools
overall within each state. Charter schools are designed around the concept of market
accountability. Therefore, the closure rate indicates the ability of the state to attract charter
schools that meet market demand. School closures have negative consequences for affected
students and the success of the charter movement as a whole. From this perspective, a high
charter school closure rate is an undesirable policy outcome. However, there is an
acknowledgement that a rate of zero is not necessarily a good outcome either. If states are
unwilling to enforce the closure mechanisms of their charter school law, they diminish
accountability for those schools. For this reason, my analysis also accounts for whether or not a
state closed any charter schools in a given year. A state’s law parameters establish the
environment in which charter schools operate, and thus should theoretically influence both the
presence of closures and the closure rate. By examining the effects of law components on charter
school closures, I will add to the conversation about the influence of a state’s charter policies on
school success.
Literature Review
There is a growing body of research on how charter schools perform in educating
children. Across the board, charter schools produce mixed results in terms of student outcomes
on standardized tests (Zimmer et al. 2011). There are inherent challenges to evaluating the
performance of charter schools as compared to their traditional public school counterparts
because charters may attract a nonrandom group of students (Zimmer et al. 2009). The market
conditions under which charter schools operate mean that they must differentiate themselves
from other educational options in order to be competitive. Many charter schools find an
educational niche, which may be anything from classical education to the education of students
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who have dropped out of traditional public schools (Epple et al. 2015). This complicates the
measurement of their success, because some charter schools may perform better or worse than
their neighboring TPS solely based on their intended student population.
However, the self-sorting of students into schools based on their preferences is not
necessarily a bad thing. Evaluating schools on the basis of academic achievement assumes that
all families have the same goals of education, and that progress towards those goals is adequately
captured by standardized test results. This may sound like a big assumption, but research has
found that standardized test scores do serve as a good predictor of future financial outcomes
along with larger economic and civic outcomes, holding all else equal (Hanushek 2006, Dee
2004). Despite these correlations, some parents and students may have educational goals that
vary from the skills captured in math and reading test scores. The presence of charter schools on
the education marketplace may allow families to find schools that better match their preferences.
There is evidence to suggest that some of the value that charter schools provide their
students may not be evident when examining test results alone. When looking at longer-term
student outcomes, such as graduation rates, college admission and persistence rates, and earlycareer earnings, one study of Florida students found those that attended a charter high school
were more successful in all these measures on average (Sass et al. 2016). The study attempted to
control for inherent selection bias by using a population of students that had all attended a charter
school in eighth grade; the treatment group attended high school at a charter school, and the
control group chose a traditional public school for high school. The findings of this study suggest
that some charter schools may be better at instilling characteristics in their students that will help
them to succeed in college or the workplace, such as resilience and work ethic, even if those
characteristics do not translate directly into better test scores during their time in K-12 schools.
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These results imply that research on charter schools as a policy option may need to expand its
definition of success to include non-test score factors. My study attempts to do this by relying on
a market-based measure of success, which represents how well charter schools within each state
are able to match the population’s education preferences.
Charter schools, like other school choice policy tools, are theoretically most impactful in
increasing statewide education quality when they are able to induce positive competitive effects
on traditional public schools. Advocates for the privatization of the education marketplace
suggest that schools will perform at maximum capacity only when they are forced to compete for
students (Friedman 1962). This is based on the assumption that the market force of competition
will create incentives for schools to increase productive efficiency. Evidence has been mixed
regarding the presence and magnitude of the competitive effect of charter schools in the
education market. One notable study found that more choices within districts led to lower
spending and improved educational attainment, wages, and standardized test scores (Hoxby
2000). A review of the research on the topic found “reasonably consistent” evidence that higher
levels of competition led to increased educational outcomes, although the increase effect size
was determined to be modest (Belfield and Levine 2002). Reviews of the existing literature have
found mostly neutral or modest positive competitive effects (Epple et al. 2015, Gill 2016).
By increasing competition, charter schools allow people to better match their preferences
and may have positive influences on traditional public school performance. State-level data on
charter school closure rates should theoretically capture the market-based nature of charter
school success. If states believe that a low charter school closure rate is a desirable outcome, they
will want to create an environment that encourages that through their policy choices. I did not
find studies in the literature that have linked the school closure rate per state to state law
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components, as I have done in this analysis. However, several studies have evaluated the effect
that various state law components have on school openings or student achievement, as discussed
below.
In their 2006 study, Shober et al. evaluated the structure of charter school laws along two
value dimensions: flexibility and accountability. They first examined the conditions that may
influence a state’s balance between those two factors, such as political and demographic makeup.
In that area, they found that charters were more likely to open in states with higher minority
populations and larger state populations (p. 580). Also, charter law revisions were likely to favor
school operators more than the original law. Shober et al. point out that original charter laws
were often structured to increase accountability in exchange for increased flexibility. The
revisions, they found, granted more flexibility but also decreased accountability. The authors
attributed this shift to the influence of interest groups and partisan factors (p. 581). Next, the
authors examined the effect of various flexibility and accountability law components on charter
school openings. Application and authorization design was found to be very influential on the
state’s number of charter openings. Unlike this previous study, I am interested the quality of the
attracted schools, as defined by their market success, instead of just the quantity of schools
entering the state. However, the opening rates used by this previous study and the closure rate
used in my design are related due to the role of authorizers in both processes.
In her overview of charter school authorizers, Sandra Vergari (2001) discusses the three
primary roles of authorizers. First, they must enter into charter agreements with potential
schools. Essentially, groups or corporations that want to open a charter school within the state
must present their case to an authorizing body, which either grants a charter contract or refuses to
do so. A school’s charter outlines the conditions of its operation, including performance
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standards, managerial requirements, and the duration of the contract. Second, authorizers are
responsible for monitoring charter schools and their boards of directors for compliance with the
conditions of the charter. Noncompliance may warrant intervention by the authorizers, which can
include sanctions or even school closure. Finally, authorizers are responsible for the renewal or
revocation of charters at the conclusion of the designated charter timeframe.
Research has been done on the effect of authorizers on student achievement. A 2013
study by Zimmer et al. (2013) examined the effects of school authorizer type on student test
score gains in a single-state analysis of Ohio. Ohio has four types of authorizers: districts,
educational service centers, nonprofit organizations, and the state. That study found that students
in schools authorized by nonprofit organizations have lower achievement gains in reading and
math than students in other charter schools. In their discussion of these results, Zimmer et al.
observe that the direction of the relationship between the authorizer and the schools is not clear.
It could be that weaker schools are attracted to nonprofits as their authorizers; another possibility
is that nonprofit organization have less ability to provide adequate oversight and accountability.
A similar study conducted in 2011 by Carlson et al. also examined the effect of charter
school authorizers on student achievement. This research was conducted in Minnesota, which
joins Ohio as one of the four states that allow nonprofit organizations to authorize charter
schools. The authors of this study found that there was no statistically significant relationship
between authorizer type and student achievement, although nonprofits were found to have the
most within-type variation in performance.
Each state’s charter school law parameters are only a piece of the puzzle when it comes
to school success. However, there does seem to be an opportunity for research in this area when
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it comes to comparing law structures across states. The examination of these trends could lead to
the isolation of certain policy structures that foster good school design.
Methods
Background
A majority of US states now have a charter school law, and some states have had charter
schools for over 25 years. Each state’s ability to attract and maintain high-quality charter schools
may be influenced by the parameters of its charter school law. Two prominent education groups
release annual scorecards ranking each state’s charter law in comparison to their determined
“best practices.” The first is the Center for Education Reform (CER), an advocacy group that
places heavy emphasis on free market principles. Its scorecard has been released annually since
1996 and currently consists of 10 criteria which all favor school autonomy (Center for Education
Reform 2017). This scorecard is grounded in theory, which can be a strength and a weakness. It
does not list evidence that their model actually produces good school outcomes; however, less
regulations may allow schools to be flexible in meeting market demands, which is the basis of
accountability for charter schools. A second group, the National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools (NAPCS), also releases an annual charter law scorecard. They compare states to their
model law, which emphasizes growth of high-performing schools and accountability for lowperforming schools (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools 2017). NAPCS released its
original model law in 2009 and updated it in 2016. The law is based on their analysis of state
charter school experiences and research. This model is much more systematic and detailed than
its CER counterpart; the NAPCS scorecard has 21 law components that each have multiple
subcomponents.
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Research Question
The two scorecards can be helpful in providing frameworks for state policymakers to
think about the merits of their law structure. By establishing best practices, these organizations
attempt to set the path for states seeking to improve their charter environment. However, neither
of these organizations provide empirical evidence linking better charter school outcomes with
their preferred law components. There is some consensus between the groups on certain policy
choices; however, there are also conflicting elements of the two scorecards (See Appendix A for
full comparison). My analysis will contribute to this discussion by comparing state-level charter
school performance data to components of each state’s law structure. My research question is as
follows: What is the relationship, if any, between a state’s charter school law and its charter
school closures?
Unit of analysis
The state-level analysis of my model is an important research decision. As previously
noted, my research design is unique in the literature because it is comparing policy outcomes
across states, which could be helpful in crafting or modifying charter school legislation.
Research focused on academic achievement is generally limited to looking for differences
between charter schools and traditional public schools within a single state. Previous studies that
have done analysis on law component effects have also been limited to within-state, school level
analysis. If done well, this provides a high degree of internal validity because all the schools in
the analyses would be operating under the same conditions, allowing the researchers to better
isolate the effects of the policy. However, they may have limited external validity; a policy that
is effective in one state may not accomplish its goals in another.
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Dependent Variable – Charter School Closures
My dependent variables are measures of charter school closures over time. Charter
schools are designed to have to prove their merit in a market environment. The threat of closure
is an incentive designed to hold charter schools accountable to high performance standards
(Vergari 2001). With that in mind, school closures are not necessarily a “bad” thing. If charter
schools could not fail, the basis of their accountability would be compromised. The movement of
students from a low-quality school to a higher quality school is undoubtedly a good thing. When
it comes to policy implications, I will not suggest that the presence of school closures indicate a
failure in law design. For that reason, my first dependent variable is a simple dummy variable of
whether or not a state with charter schools closed any of them in a given year.
However, a high statewide closure rate indicates that the details of the state’s charter
policies may need to be reevaluated. A high percentage of school closures can have negative
direct and indirect effects on statewide education quality. Students who attended the closed
school may be negatively affected by having to switch schools, sometimes in the middle of the
academic year. The students attending nearby traditional public schools may also be negatively
affected by an influx of displaced students, which can be disruptive or cause issues of
overcrowding. On a broader scale, charter school closures can be detrimental to public
perception of charter schools as a whole, which could weaken public support of charters as well
as other school choice policies. Theoretically, an optimal charter school closure rate would be
greater than zero percent but not too high as to indicate the over-authorization of ill-equipped
schools.
I acknowledge that using school closures means that my analysis is looking only at
extreme cases of failure. By classifying schools into “winners” which remained open and

Byers 11

“losers” which were closed, my model neglects the very diverse performance of charter schools
across the nation that remain open. It is probable that there are poor-performing charter schools
across the country that, for whatever reason, are staying open. There is potential that these
schools could bias my analysis in favor of states with particularly lenient standards for
performance-based closure. The validity of the state charter school closure rate as my dependent
variable relies heavily on market accountability. Every charter school, regardless of performance,
is open because it attracts an adequate number of students to remain in operation. My research
question is not focusing on the performance of charters, but rather on the performance of the
state’s charter law in its ability to foster an environment for successful schools, where success is
defined by their ability to meet market demands.
This framework is complicated by the fact that charter schools sometimes close despite
their market enrollment success due to other breaches of their charter, such as financial
mismanagement. This can be reconciled with my market accountability perspective by viewing
the situation as a principal-agent relationship. In a market accountability model, families are the
principals and schools are the agents in the education exchange. The basis of the principal-agent
problem is that an information asymmetry exists between the two parties (Pratt and Zechhauser
1985). One way that the principal can remedy this is through monitoring mechanisms. In this
situation, charter school authorizers – or other entities responsible for the closure of schools –
serve as a monitoring mechanism. The closure rate captures the true preferences of the market
because if an authorizer closes a school for financial mismanagement, it is acting on behalf of the
preferences of the families. This rests on the assumption that if families had better information
about the practices of those mismanaged schools, they would not have chosen them.
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Independent Variables – Charter Law Components
One element of a state’s charter school law is its creation of charter school authorizing
entities. Authorizers are responsible for overseeing charter schools and their boards of directors.
Some states have multiple types of authorizers while others only have one. I am interested in
how the type and number of types of authorizers affect the charter landscape for that state. As
previously noted, states with high charter school closure rates may have a problem with their
authorization process being too lenient. My hypothesis is that a higher number of authorizer
types will lead to a higher charter school closure rate. A variety of authorizer types could lead to
schools “shopping around” until they were able to find a willing authorizer, regardless of flaws
in their school proposal. This component has implications because there are significant barriers
that authorizers face in closing schools, so it is generally better for authorizers to have a rigorous
application process than to have to close failing schools (Vergari 2001). Both advocacy
organizations agree that states should have multiple types of authorizers.
My data on authorizers is from 1995 to 2013 and includes the six types of authorizers as
categorized by the National Association of Charter School Authorizers (2018): higher education
institution (HEI), independent charter board (ICB), local education agency (LEA), noneducational government entity (NEG), not-for-profit organization (NFP), and state education
agency (SEA). My primary model examines the effect of the number of types of authorizers on
charter school closures. I also conducted some basic analysis to examine the relationships
between the specific types of authorizers.
The organizations that produce annual scorecards also agree that state laws should not
cap the number of charter schools that are permitted. I am including the presence of a charter cap
in my analysis because it may have an effect on the school closure rate. If a state has a school
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cap, its closure rate is likely to be low once the state is at capacity. Artificially suppressing the
market through a cap may limit the closure rate, but this is not necessarily a policy success if
there is demand in the market that is not being met. This is a policy option that some states
initially adopted but have since abolished; those states could provide insight into the effect of
removing a cap. NAPCS has been collecting this data on an annual basis since the beginning of
its model law report cards in 2010. The Education Commission of the States has collected this
data since 1996 but not on an annual basis. Using these data sources along with original research,
I complied data on charter cap policies for all the years present in my analysis.
Control Variables
There are several additional factors that may also influence a state’s charter school
closures besides its charter school law structure. The amount of time that a state has had charter
schools could affect the closure rate as the market simply leveled out over time. For example, a
state’s first few years after charter adoption could be characterized by various charters trying to
find their place in the market, with some succeeding and others failing. Once a state has had
charter schools for a significant time, some of that turmoil may have subsided, making its closure
rate lower than a recent adopter who is still in the trial period. For this reason, my model controls
the number of years since charter law adoption Additionally, I conducted a sensitivity analysis
including only states that have had their charter school laws for more than five years.
My model also includes the Fording revised 1960-2013 citizen ideology series as a
control (Berry et al. 1998). Charter schools are not necessarily a clear-cut partisan policy option;
they have historically had support and opposition from both sides of the aisle. However, state
ideology serves as a good indicator for other policies that could influence charter schools. In
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particular, ideology is highly correlated with a state’s right to work policies, which could
influence charter school success due to the historical strength of unions within public education.
A related variable that could also influence charter market success in a given state is the
quality of each state’s traditional public schools. To control for this, I have included statewide
average scores on the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) for 8th grade math.
This variable was not available for every year in my model, so I assumed that changes are linear
and constant between observed values in order to generate missing year data. Each state has its
share of high-quality and low-quality schools. This variable does not capture within-state
differences in TPS quality, but it is helpful in teasing out the quality of the education
marketplace in which charters are competing across states.
Another variable that could influence charter school closure rates from state to state is the
amount of funding that charter schools receive in comparison to traditional public schools. One
comparative variable would be the amount of funding charter schools receive per dollar spent on
traditional public schools in each state. This controls for the relative disadvantage that charter
schools face in educating their students. I was able to find data for the years 2003, 2007, and
2011 for a maximum of 31 states from reports done by the University of Arkansas and Ball State
University. Again, I estimated the missing years within that timeframe on the assumption that
changes are linear and constant between observed values over time. Those studies weighted the
statewide TPS district funding amount to account for differences in charter school concentration
in urban areas across states. I used their numbers for weighted district per pupil funding and
charter school per pupil funding to generate a variable that conveys the amount charter schools
received per dollar received by traditional public schools.
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Model Design
My data consists of state-level data from the period of 1991 to 2013. My goal is to isolate
the effects of my specified law components on each state’s charter school closures over time. For
this reason, I will use an OLS regression model on panel data with a state fixed effect estimation.
Some states in my model have had charter schools for 26 years. States that adopted their
charter school law since 2013 are not included within my model. Additionally, states were not
included in years during which they had no open charter schools. Once I applied these
parameters, I had a total of 629 observations on 40 states plus the District of Columbia across a
maximum of 23 years. Due to limited data availability for my funding control, I ran multiple
versions of my model to include and exclude this variable. This was a trade-off between sample
size – both in number of observations and number of included states – and controlling for what is
likely an influential factor. I also conducted a second set of analyses looking only at states that
had their charter schools for five years or more.
My model includes a fixed effects estimator to control for time invariant characteristics
of each state over time. This is necessary because each state has a unique set of laws and culture,
which are unmeasurable but still need to be accounted for in my model.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Although there is no established standard of what a state’s charter school closure rate
should be, it can be helpful to compare each state to the national average. Interestingly, my data
had no recorded charter school closings until 1998, which is six years after the first charter
schools opened. To put this in perspective, there were 18 states with open charter schools in
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1997, the previous year. Some states had only one open charter that year, but some had as many
as 62 in Michigan or 87 in California.

Figure 1: National Average of State Charter School Closure Rates, 1991-2013

As shown in Figure 2, the percent of states with charter schools that close any schools
within a given year has dramatically increased over time. Despite this overall trend, there were 8
states that had never closed a charter school as of 2013.
Number of Authorizer Types
As previously discussed, there are six types of authorizers, which include local education
agencies, state education agencies, higher education institutions, not-for-profits, non-education
governmental entities, and independent charter boards. LEAs are the most popular type of
authorizer, and having two authorizers is the most popular trend in authorizing types. Figure 3
shows the number of states with each number of authorizing types by year.
To better understand the authorizing landscape across states, I first conducted correlation
tests to see if there were any patterns authorizer composition and how they relate to one another.
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There is a significant and strong positive correlation between local education agencies (LEA)
and higher education institutions. On the other hand, state education agencies have a significant

Figure 2: Percent of States with Charter Schools that Closed Any Charters, 1991-2013

negative correlation with higher education institutions, non-education government entities, and
independent charter boards. These relationships could be due to the power dynamics at play
between these groups. Because charter school laws are constructed at the state level, states that
grant authorizing authority to the SEAs may not want to weaken the state’s power by allowing
for competing authorizers. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between SEAs
and LEAs as authorizers. It is possible that this stems from the state not viewing LEAs as
competition since the state has control over them. Some states structure their authorizing process
so that charter applications are originally proposed to LEAs, but denied applications can appeal
to the SEA as a secondary authorizer. This system maintains the state as the ultimate authorizing
authority.
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Models including the funding control were limited in scope to the years of 2003 to 2011.
During that time, few states changed the number of authorizing types that they had. This resulted
in my independent variable being engulfed into the state fixed effects estimator. In order to
isolate the effects of the number of authorizing types, I examined the relationship of that variable
on the fixed effects estimator itself. This reveals the true relationship between number of
authorizing types on my original model.

Figure 3: Number of States per Number of Authorizing Types, 1995-2013
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The number of authorizing types was not statistically significantly related to the fixed
effect estimator. However, some categories within the variable had a negative statistically
significant effect on the school closure rate. States that have two or three types of authorizers are
less likely to close schools than states with one type or four types (only one state, Louisiana, has
five types, so that category was dropped from the analysis). This finding was consistent with
models that did not include the funding control and thus had a larger sample size.
There are two possible explanations for this trend. The first relates to the perspective of
states that choose only one authorizer or four authorizers. One authorizing type indicates that the
state may desire stronger control over charter school openings and closings. This theory is
supported by the previously discussed negative correlation between SEAs and certain other types
of authorizers. On the other hand, states that allow four authorizers may create a sense of
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competition amongst authorizers. They may be held accountable if they do not close poorperforming schools by the threat of being a replaceable authorizer.

Figure 4: Regression Results, All States
Any
Variables
Closings

Any
Closings

Closure
Rate

Closure
Rate

Number of Observations

215

604

215

604

Law Components
Number of Authorizer Types

---

-.0137
(.0287)

---

-.1556
(.1886)

-.2034
(.1387)

-.0238
(.0780)

.4933
(.5581)

-.6729
(.8138)

-.0069
(.0043)
-.0088
(.0173)
.0887***
(.0218)
Yes
.6268
(.5570)

-.0106***
(.0027)
.0021
(.0101)
.0431***
(.0094)
No

-.0399*
(.0196)
-.1191*
(.0693)
.3580***
(.0861)
Yes
1.645
(1.904)

-.0550***
(.0169)
-.1451
(.1339)
.2299**
(.0942)
No

Presence of Charter Cap
Controls
Ideology Scores
NAEP 8th Grade Math Scores
Law Age
Funding Control Included

*Indicates significance at the 90% confidence level
** Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
*** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level
The other explanation is tied to the composition authorizing type. For example, singleauthorizers are exclusively LEAs (17 states), SEAs (5 States), and ICBs (3 states). It could be
that certain authorizing types are more likely to close schools. If that is the case, those that are
typically single-authorizers may be more likely to close schools, and having four types may
mean that you are more likely to include a high-closure type within your authorizing portfolio.
Charter School Cap
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No version of my model found a significant relationship between the presence of a
charter school cap and state charter school closures. This is an interesting finding because charter
caps are strongly opposed by many charter school supporters, including both organizations that
release charter law rankings.
Duration Variables
The results of my original analysis showed a significant and positive relationship between
state charter school closures and the length of time that the state has had its charter school law.
This suggests that the longer a state has had charter schools, the more likely it is to have school
closures and the higher its closure rate will be. Although this contradicts my original hypothesis,
there are several possible factors that could contribute to this relationship. First, it is not
unreasonable for states to give their first charter schools adequate time to demonstrate their
performance in one direction or another. So, it may be expected that the first three to five years
have less closures as states or authorizers allow charter school results to unfold. It could also be
the case that authorizers are more lenient on schools during the early years of charter adoption
due to a learning curve on the authorizer’s part. For this reason, I conducted a sensitivity
analysis, where I ran my models again using only states that had their charter law for five years
or more.
This model does not include a funding variable because by 2003, the first year for which
I have funding data, 40 of the 41 states had adopted their charter law already. Of those, only 6
states had had their law less than 5 years. It happens to be that my funding variable does not
contain data for any of those 6 states, meaning any model including my funding variable was
looking only at veteran states anyway.
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Figure 5: Regression Results, Veteran States Only
Any
Variables
Closings
Number of Observations
Law Components
Number of Authorizer Types
Presence of Charter Cap
Controls
Ideology Scores

Closure
Rate

604

604

.0130
(.0352)
-.0773
(.0727)

-.0090
(.1256)
-.9593
(.8861)

-.0104***
(.0024)
th
NAEP 8 Grade Math Scores
.0440***
(.0070)
Veteran Status
-.0590
(.0510)
*Indicates significance at the 90% confidence level
** Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
*** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level

-.0539***
(.0158)
.0799
(.0524)
-.3502
(.6059)

Future research could compare the academic achievement success of early opening
charter schools with those that open later to see if approval standards become more rigorous over
time. Public awareness and scrutiny of charter performance may also increase over time, leading
to more school closures as information becomes available in the education marketplace and
parents make different decisions about where to send their children. This trend could also be a
consequence of the time period over which it occurred. There was a huge difference in the
availability of information between the 1990s and the early 2010s due to technological advances.
The public in general could be holding charter schools – and perhaps all schools – to a higher
standard based on easily-accessible information. Another possible explanation for the increase in
school closings over time could be tied to the market viability of charter schools that open right
when a law is passed versus those that open later. If a local market has a high demand for a
certain education preference, that market may attract a charter school soon after the state’s law

Byers 22

adoption. Charters that open later may not be as aligned with market demand. This time variable
may need to be explored more in future research. States who are new adopters or have yet to pass
charter legislation may benefit from looking to their veteran counterparts for best practices in
authorizing and monitoring of early schools.
Control Variables
Citizen ideology was found to be significant when the model did not control for
differences in funding across states. Once the relative funding of charter schools was taken into
account, ideology did not have an effect on whether or not a state closed any schools. However,
it still did have a modest negative effect on the state’s closure rate. This means that, among states
that close schools, being more liberal is correlated with a lower school closure rate, all else
equal. As previously mentioned, one possible explanation could be the increased strength of
unions in more liberal states. Unions tend to be strongly associated with traditional public
schools, and may be skeptical of alternative models such as charter schools. If this is the case,
charter schools that are able to open in those states may be more likely to stay open because they
were more thoroughly vetted than charter schools in more conservative states without union
influence.
Once accounting for differences in charter school funding, NAEP scores were also found
to have a negative statistically significant relationship on the school closure rate, with no effect
on whether or not a state closed any schools. This means that, among states that actually close
schools, those with higher 8th grade math NAEP scores in traditional public schools have a lower
charter school closure rate. In my model with only veteran states, NAEP scores were found to
have a statistically significant and positive relationship on a state’s likelihood of closing any
schools, with no effect on the actual closure rate. This variable was intended to control for the
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quality of the traditional public schools against which charter schools in the state have to
compete. I expected that high-quality traditional public schools would lead to more charter
school closures because parents would be more willing to move their children to the neighboring
TPS if the charters do not perform well.
The negative relationship from my original analysis could be revealing information about
state ability to attract high quality charter schools, instead of their ability to maintain the ones
they have. If higher TPS quality is driving up market expectations, charter schools may
understand that they have to raise their performance in order to be competitive in those markets.
This could deter certain potential charter schools from opening, leading to a lower closure rate as
those that actually enter the market are the ones most likely to succeed anyway. This has
negative policy implications for the effectiveness of charter schools as an alternative to lowquality traditional public schools. States with poor-performing traditional public schools may be
more likely to attract low-quality charter schools than states with high-performing traditional
public schools. This is not good news for parents and students within those states because the
quality of their educational choices does not necessarily increase.
There is an alternative possibility that some reverse causality is at play. States with a low
charter school closure rate have schools that are more successful at meeting market demand. If
charter schools are having a competitive effect on the state’s traditional public schools, then they
could be driving the NAEP scores upwards for that state.
Case Study
When it comes to charter school law components, there is not a definitive set of best
practices that will ensure a healthy charter school environment. As previously discussed, there
are two prominent interest groups that release annual rankings of state laws in comparison to
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their own model laws: The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS) and the
Center for Education Reform (CER). In order to see how these two model laws differ in their
recommendations, I compared how each state ranked on the 2012 version of the reports from
both organizations. Nineteen states ranked higher on the CER model while twenty states fared
better on the NAPCS model (See Appendix B for full list). The average state ranking difference
between the two models was approximately 7 spots, with a median of 5 spots.
Three states scored exactly the same on both rankings. Minnesota was ranked as the
second best law in the nation by both systems, behind Maine in the NAPCS system and DC in
the CER model. Kansas ranked 39th in both models. Interestingly, Mississippi was labeled as the
worst law by both organizations. Mississippi was not included in my original analysis because it
did not have any charter schools during the 1991-2013 period of my study. An additional nine
states (Colorado, Iowa, Oregon, Louisiana, Wyoming, Oklahoma, California, New York, and
Utah) scored within 2 points of the same ranking on both systems.
The 12 states that rank within 2 points of each other on both organization’s list suggest
that there is consensus among the interest groups regarding best practices. In fact, the two
systems do have some elements in common. They both agree that states should not cap charter
schools, there should be multiple authorizing entities, and that charter school should be provided
with equitable operational and facility funding. Other elements of the two scorecards are similar,
but have a slightly different emphasis, tone, or intention. Some elements of the two scorecards
seem to be in direct opposition to one another. CER advocates for authorizer independence while
NAPCS favors the requirement of an authorizer accountability system. Additionally, there are
some components of each scorecard that the other does not directly consider. The 2017 CER
scorecard weighs a law’s provision of Pre-K funds, for which there is no NAPCS equivalent.
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NAPCS has 8 components that do not fit neatly into one of the CER categories. That being said,
CER’s scorecard has 10 categories that are relatively broad compared to the detailed components
of the NAPCS system. The matching of components (Appendix A) across the two systems was
an original assessment based on the descriptions provided by each organization.
Despite the significant number of states that scored similarly on the two rankings in 2012,
there are 17 states that had more than a 5-place difference in ranking across the two
organizations. Notably, that includes four outlying states, the rankings for which varied by 15
places or more on the two systems. Two of these states were ranked higher by CER; Idaho and
Wisconsin each ranked 20 places higher on that list than they did on the NAPCS rankings. On
the other end of the spectrum, New Mexico and Maine ranked 18 and 26 spots higher
respectively on the NAPCS model than they did on the CER equivalent.
The states with huge ranking differences would be rightly confused about the quality of
their charter school law and what improvements could be made to it. In the following sections, I
will examine each outlier’s rankings and discuss possible reasons for the different judgements of
the two organizations.
Idaho
Idaho scored 20 places better in the CER model than the NAPCS in 2012. It was ranked
twelfth on the CER list and thirty-second on the NAPCS list. The largest difference in score
between the two models was as it relates to CER’s district autonomy component. This is in direct
opposition to the NAPCS performance-based charter contract requirement, which trades school
autonomy for more accountability. Thus, it makes sense that Idaho did much better in CER’s
model for that variable.
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Figure 6: Idaho Scorecard Comparison

IDAHO
CER Measure

Percent
Score

NAPCS Measure

Percent
Score

Percentage
Point
Difference
-17
33

Independent/
Multiple
Authorizers

33%

Multiple Authorizers Available
Authorizer and Overall Program
Accountability System Required

50%
0%

Number of
Schools
Allowed**
State Autonomy

100%

No Caps**

25%

75

60%

50%

10

District
Autonomy

80%

Automatic Exemption from Many State and
District Law and Regulations (12)
Performance-Based Charter Contract
Required
Comprehensive Charter School Monitoring
and Data Collection Processes
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools,
with Independent Public Charter School
Boards
Automatic Collective Bargaining Exemption

0%

80

75%

5

100%

-20

100%

-20

50%

30

50%

0

25%

-25

44%

12

Teacher
Freedom

80%

100% Funding*

50%

Facilities Funds*

0%

Total Score

56%

Access to Relevant Employee Retirement
Systems
Equitable Operational Funding and Equal
Access to All State and Federal Categorical
Funding
Equitable Access to Capital Funding and
Facilities
Total Score

*CER does not specify point value maximums for these two individual components; they are
worth a combined 15 points, and I assumed that the operational funding was worth 10 points
and the facility funding was worth 5 points.
**Idaho repealed its charter cap in 2012; the CER score reflects this while the NAPCS score
does not.
Interestingly, Idaho has several components for which they received a higher percentage
score on the NAPCS component than the corresponding CER one, despite their overall higher
ranking from CER. One such category was the area of teacher freedom; however, the CER point
deduction appears to come solely from charter teachers being forced into the state retirement
system, meaning CER did not penalize an aspect of their collective bargaining exemption.
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Idaho also scored higher on the NAPCS component of multiple authorizers than the CER
equivalent. Idaho has two types of authorizers: local school boards and an independent charter
board. However, the ICB can only authorize virtual schools or schools whose applications were
previously rejected by an LEA. Both organizations deduct points for this feature, since the ICB is
severely limited in its authorizing power.
Wisconsin
Like Idaho, Wisconsin also placed 20 points better on the CER ranking than the NAPCS
one, with rankings of 16 and 36, respectively.
Figure 7: Wisconsin Scorecard Comparison

WISCONSIN
CER Measure

Independent/
Multiple
Authorizers
Number of
Schools Allowed
State Autonomy
District
Autonomy

Teacher Freedom

Percent
Score
20%

100%
100%
60%

60%

100% Funding*

40%

Facilities Funds*

0%

Total Score

51%

NAPCS Measure

Percent
Score

Percentage
Point
Difference
-30
20

Multiple Authorizers Available
Authorizer and Overall Program
Accountability System Required
No Caps

50%
0%
75%

25

Automatic Exemption from Many State
and District Law and Regulations (12)
Performance-Based Charter Contract
Required
Comprehensive Charter School
Monitoring and Data Collection
Processes
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous
Schools, with Independent Public Charter
School Boards
Automatic Collective Bargaining
Exemption
Access to Relevant Employee Retirement
Systems
Equitable Operational Funding and Equal
Access to All State and Federal
Categorical Funding
Equitable Access to Capital Funding and
Facilities
Total Score

50%

50

50%

10

25%

35

25%

35

50%

10

25%

35

25%

15

25%

-25

33%

18
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Wisconsin scored slightly better on the CER model in their charter cap component.
NAPCS probably withholds points in this category due to Wisconsin’s limit on the number of
virtual charter students as well as its limit on one of its University authorizers (Education
Commission of the States 2010). The University of Wisconsin-Parkside can only authorize one
charter school. CER penalizes the state for this in its category dealing with independent
authorizers instead of considering it to be a “cap.”
New Mexico
New Mexico was ranked as the fourth-best law by NAPCS, but placed right around the
middle of the pack at number 22 with the CER report. This is an 18-spot difference between the
two systems for 2012.
New Mexico has two authorizer types – local school boards and the state board of
education. They receive full credit under the NAPCS model for this; however, on the CER
equivalent they score a mere 27 percent. CER does not provide an explanation for this deduction
(page 57).
In the area of state autonomy, New Mexico scores higher on the CER component. This is
due to differences in how the two organizations view the state’s approach to operational
exemptions. New Mexico does not automatically exempt charter schools from state
requirements, but instead issues waivers, some of which have to be requested on a case-by-case
basis. CER seems to believe this gives schools adequate autonomy, while NAPCS does not seem
to feel the same.
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Figure 8: New Mexico Scorecard Comparison

NEW MEXICO
CER Measure

Percent
Score

NAPCS Measure

Percent
Score

Percentage
Point
Difference
73
23

Independent/
Multiple
Authorizers

27%

Multiple Authorizers Available
Authorizer and Overall Program
Accountability System Required

100%
50%

Number of
Schools Allowed
State Autonomy

40%

No Caps

50%

10

80%

25%

-55

District
Autonomy

60%

Automatic Exemption from Many State and
District Law and Regulations
Performance-Based Charter Contract
Required
Comprehensive Charter School Monitoring
and Data Collection Processes
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools,
with Independent Public Charter School
Boards
Automatic Collective Bargaining Exemption

75%

15

100%

40

100%

40

100%

20

50%

-30

50%

-20

50%

50

65%

18

Teacher
Freedom

80%

100% Funding*

70%

Facilities Funds*

0%

Total Score

47%

Access to Relevant Employee Retirement
Systems
Equitable Operational Funding and Equal
Access to All State and Federal Categorical
Funding
Equitable Access to Capital Funding and
Facilities
Total Score

*See note on Figure 6
Maine
Maine was the state with the most dramatic difference in rankings. It was considered by
NAPCS to be the number one charter school law in the country. CER ranked it well below the
median at twenty-seventh, a 26-spot difference.
The two scorecards give Maine similar rankings on many of their shared components.
They each penalize it for its restrictive caps on the number of schools as well as student
enrollment. They positively score the state’s choice to allow teachers to opt out of collective
bargaining.
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Figure 9: Maine Scorecard Comparison

MAINE
CER Measure

Percent
Score

Independent/
Multiple
Authorizers

27%

Number of
Schools
Allowed
State Autonomy
District
Autonomy

Teacher
Freedom

Percent
Score

Percentage
Point
Difference
23

Multiple Authorizers Available

50%

Authorizer and Overall Program
Accountability System Required

75%

48

30%

No Caps

25%

5

60%

Automatic Exemption from Many State and
District Law and Regulations (12)

75%

15

60%

Performance-Based Charter Contract
Required
Comprehensive Charter School Monitoring
and Data Collection Processes
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools,
with Independent Public Charter School
Boards

100%

40

75%

15

100%

40

Automatic Collective Bargaining
Exemption

75%

-5

Access to Relevant Employee Retirement
Systems

100%

20

Equitable Operational Funding and Equal
Access to All State and Federal Categorical
Funding
Equitable Access to Capital Funding and
Facilities

100%

30

25%

25

Total Score

76%

32

80%

100% Funding*

70%

Facilities
Funds*

0%

Total Score

NAPCS Measure

44%

*See note on Figure 6
Despite these similarities, there are large differences in the outcomes of the two ranking
systems. Most notable is the difference between the authorizing components. Although Maine
does have two different types of authorizers – LEAs and an Independent Charter Board – CER
attributes their low score in this area to the state’s lack of an appeal process and the fact that the
ICB is subject to state board oversight. NAPCS, on the other hand, acknowledges the state’s
multiple authorizers but withholds points due to limits placed on those authorizers. The second
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NAPCS authorizing component directly opposes its CER equivalent. While CER favors
independence, NAPCS values accountability, leading to a large difference in points on that
component. Maine is rewarded in the NAPCS system for requiring authorizers to submit annual
report to the state commissioner of education and for allowing the commissioner to have
oversight of authorizers through sanctions.
Although CER scores Maine at only 60 percent on the category of district autonomy, the
report gives no real explanation for that decision besides saying that autonomy is “limited.” On
the other hand, NAPCS gives Maine perfect scores on two of the three district autonomy
components, and only deducts points on the third component because Maine does not official
require authorizers to publish annual school performance reports. This reveals a difference in
emphasis on these categories; NAPCS is less committed to autonomy, but more committed to
accountability than CER.
Conclusion: Policy Implications and Limitations
With the conflicting messages being sent from prominent charter school advocacy
organizations, state leaders are being pulled in different directions when it comes to how their
charter laws should be improved going forward. Some charter advocates argue for autonomy
above all else; this is a very market-centered approach. On the other hand, groups like NAPCS
tend to be more willing to trade some autonomy for increased accountability. As evidenced by
the case studies, these different perspectives can lead to very different ideas about which policy
options are best. In light of this, the question may become: which approach produces better
outcomes?
Ideally, policymakers should be able to look across state lines for ideas about what law
components have been successful and which have not. When it comes to charter school policies,
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however, there are many barriers to cross-state comparisons. My project attempted to navigate
some of those barriers by using charter school closings as the measure of success.
Using school closings frames charter school success from a market perspective. This can
raise red flags if the closure rate is high or if there are no closings whatsoever. It is possible that
a state may close no charter schools in a given year because all of their schools are meeting the
performance and operational requirements while also attracting enough students to remain open.
For this reason, states should assess if their closure rate of zero indicates a policy success or a
lack of enforcement of their authorizing and monitoring standards. Further research could
include a detailed analysis the details of closed schools, including the length of time they were in
operation and the reason for their closure. If a charter school closes at the time of its first charter
renewal period or before, it may be argued that that school should not have been authorized in
the first place.
The law components included in my analysis did not have a statistically significant effect
on a state’s likelihood to close charter schools or its charter school closure rate. Both of my
included components, the presence of a charter school cap and multiple authorizing types, are
policy choices for which both prominent organizations advocate. Despite this consensus, these
components were not found to have an impact on outcomes. As previously discussed, some
categories of authorizing types did have an effect, even though the overall component did not.
Going forward, further research could do a full comparison of scorecard rankings on
charter school outcomes. One ranking system may better correlate with overall results than the
other. As further data becomes available on charter school funding, my research could be
expanded to include more years with a funding control. For now, this analysis indicates that
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those advocating for charter school caps and multiple authorizing types may be fighting for
policies that, contrary to previous belief, have no impact on charter school outcomes.
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Appendix A – 2017 Scorecard Comparisons, Matched and Unique Components
Matching Components –

CER
Multiple Authorizers
Authorizer Independence
of Local/State Authority
No Charter Caps
Scaling Up
School Autonomy

Status
Similar
Opposed
Same
Similar
Similar

Opposed
Opposed
State Allows Freedom to
Innovate

Similar

Teacher Freedom

Similar
Similar
Opposed

Operating Funds

Same

Facility Funds/Financing

Same

NAPCS
Non-District Authorizers Available
Authorizer and Overall Program
Accountability System Required
No Caps
Multischool Charter Contracts and/or
Multicharter Contract Boards Allowed
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools
with Independent Charter Public Schools
Boards
Performance-Based Charter Contracts
Required
Comprehensive Charter Public School
Monitoring and Data Collection Processes
Automatic Exemptions from Many State and
District Laws and Regulations
A Variety of Charter Public Schools Allowed
Automatic Collective Bargaining Exemption
Access to Relevant Employee Retirement
Systems
Equitable Operational Funding and Equal
Access to All State and Federal Categorical
Funding
Equitable Access to Capital Funding and
Facilities
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Unique Components –

Component
Pre-K Funds
Adequate Authorizer Funding
Transparent Charter Application,
Review, and Decision-making Process
Clear Processes for Renewal,
Nonrenewal, and Revocation Decisions
Transparency Regarding Educational
Service Providers (ESPs) Allowed
Clear Student Enrollment and Lottery
Procedures
Extracurricular and Interscholastic
Activities Eligibility and Access
Clear Provisions Regarding Special
Education Responsibilities
Full-Time Virtual Charter School
Provisions

Organization
CER Only
NAPCS Only
NAPCS Only
NAPCS Only
NAPCS Only
NAPCS Only
NAPCS Only
NAPCS Only
NAPCS Only
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Appendix B –2012 Scorecard Ranking Comparisons

State
ME
NM
AR
MA
NH
GA
IL
RI
CT
FL
NV
TX
VA
HI
CO
IA
OR
LA
WY
KS
MN
MS
OK
CA
NY
UT
IN
PA
AK
DE
MD
NC
MI
MO
NJ
SC
TN
DC
AZ
OH
ID
WI

CER
27
22
31
19
33
20
30
32
34
8
25
28
41
38
9
40
23
14
35
39
2
42
26
7
6
10
3
13
36
18
37
29
5
11
24
17
21
1
4
15
12
16

NAPCS
1
4
17
5
19
14
24
26
29
3
20
23
37
35
7
38
21
13
34
39
2
42
27
9
8
12
6
16
40
22
41
33
10
18
31
25
30
11
15
28
32
36

Rank Difference
26
18
14
14
14
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
0
0
0
-1
-2
-2
-2
-3
-3
-4
-4
-4
-4
-5
-7
-7
-8
-9
-10
-11
-13
-20
-20
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